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AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION WAIVER: A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR 
BUEHLER 
Daniel Klerman* 
INTRODUCTION 
For nearly a century, black letter law has dictated that subject matter 
jurisdiction is non-waivable.1 Both litigants and judges can raise subject 
matter jurisdiction defects at any time, even on appeal. Current doctrine 
indicates that the parties’ consent to federal jurisdiction, whether explicit 
or tacit, is insufficient, because subject matter jurisdiction involves 
federalism. It is not the prerogative of the parties to derogate from state 
court jurisdiction. Rather, it is the constitutional obligation of federal 
judges to self-police the line between federal and state courts. 
Despite its solid basis in precedent, a parade of commentators has 
attacked the rigidity of current law as wasteful. Commentators argue that 
cases dismissed for jurisdictional reasons after trial or on appeal are 
often followed by costly duplicative litigation in state court. In addition, 
critics assert that the non-waivability of subject matter jurisdiction 
encourages inefficient strategic behavior. For example, if a defendant 
has information unknown to the plaintiff that would defeat subject 
matter jurisdiction, the defendant can wait to raise the jurisdictional 
defect until it feels threatened by an adverse judgment. This gives the 
defendant an option to relitigate the case in state court. Plaintiffs can 
also engage in the same strategic, yet inefficient, behavior, and wait to 
raise jurisdictional defects. Therefore, these commentators have called 
upon the federal courts to give up their jurisdictional “fetish” and treat 
* Charles L. and Ramona I. Hilliard Professor of Law and History, USC Gould School of Law. The 
author can be reached at dklerman@law.usc.edu and www.klerman.com. The author would like to 
thank Scott Altman, Jennifer Bryant, Dustin Buehler, Jeffrey Gilbert, Jamie Heine, William 
Hubbard, and Dan Nabel for helpful comments and suggestions. 
1. For the surprisingly recent emergence of the no-waiver rule, see generally Michael G. Collins, 
Jurisdictional Exceptionalism, 93 VA. L. REV. 1829, 1861–1876 (2007); Dan B. Dobbs, Beyond 
Bootstrap: Foreclosing the Issue of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Before Final Judgment, 51 MINN. 
L. REV. 491, 507–512 (1967). 
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subject matter jurisdiction like personal jurisdiction: if neither the parties 
nor the court raises the jurisdictional problem early in the proceedings, 
these critics argue, the objection should be waived and therefore cannot 
be raised later.2 
Dustin Buehler’s article, Solving Jurisdiction’s Social Cost,3 makes a 
worthy contribution to this debate. He steers a middle course between 
current law (non-waivability) and proposals that would allow federal 
courts to continue adjudicating cases with jurisdictional defects as long 
as neither party objected in a timely fashion. He proposes a rule 
requiring federal district court judges to issue a “jurisdictional 
certification order,” including findings of fact and conclusions of law, at 
the close of pleadings.4 To facilitate preparation of such orders, parties 
would have to plead jurisdictional facts with particularity.5 A party 
could immediately appeal a jurisdictional order. However, if a party 
failed to appeal, it would lose the ability to challenge subject matter 
jurisdiction later.6 
In addition, on a theoretical level, Professor Buehler criticizes prior 
reform proposals as “monistic,” because they consider only efficiency 
values, without taking into account structural values such as federalism.7 
Instead, he argues that efficiency and structural values are 
incommensurable and must be brought into “equilibrium.”8 
While I share Professor Buehler’s view that reforms must take into 
account both litigation costs and federalism, I disagree with his analysis 
and proposed solution. In Part I, I contend that jurisdictional 
certification, although typically a simple task, would be too costly, 
because it would need to be performed in all of the more than 250,000 
civil cases filed in federal court every year.9 I also disagree that 
2. See generally AM. LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND 
FEDERAL COURTS 366–369 (1969) (labeling jurisdictional nonwaivability a “fetish”); Qian A. Gao, 
“Salvage Operations Are Ordinarily Preferable to the Wrecking Ball”: Barring Challenges to 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2369 (2005); Bruce A. Wagman, Second Bites at 
the Jurisdictional Apple: A Proposal for Preventing False Assertions of Diversity of Citizenship, 41 
HASTINGS L.J. 1417 (1990). 
3. Dustin E. Buehler, Solving Jurisdiction’s Social Cost, 89 WASH. L. REV. 653 (2014). 
4. Id. at 694–97.  
5. Id. at 698.  
6. Id. at 703–05. 
7. Id. at 663.  
8. Id. at 668. 
9. Judicial Business 2013–U.S. District Courts, UNITED STATES COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2013/us-district-courts.aspx (last visited Nov. 1, 
2014). 
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efficiency and structural values are incommensurable. In Part II, I point 
out that efficiency considerations encompass more than litigation costs 
and include the benefits of the decentralized decision-making fostered 
by federalism. In Part III, I propose that federalism concerns could be 
more efficiently handled by giving federal judges discretion to retain or 
dismiss cases in which jurisdictional defects are belatedly discovered, 
depending on whether the case implicates significant federalism 
concerns. In order to identify cases in which such concerns are 
important, federal judges could be empowered and encouraged to call 
for the views of the relevant state attorney general. Finally, in Part IV, I 
note that, before making any changes to jurisdictional procedures, it is 
important to recognize the ways in which the current rules may 
encourage early and thorough investigation of subject matter jurisdiction 
by both parties and judges. 
I. THE COST OF JURISDICTIONAL CERTIFICATION, 
HEIGHTENED PLEADING, AND INTERLOCUTORY 
APPEALS 
There are seven reasons that the costs of Professor Buehler’s proposal 
may outweigh its benefits. First, although the proposed certification 
would usually be easy to prepare, it would have to be issued in all of the 
more than 250,000 civil cases filed in federal court each year.10 In 
contrast, Professor Buehler estimates that only about 500 cases are 
belatedly dismissed on jurisdictional grounds each year.11 This estimate 
indicates that for every relitigation avoided, district courts would have to 
produce 500 certification orders. It seems likely that the aggregate time 
required to prepare jurisdictional certification in all cases would far 
exceed the time saved by avoiding relitigation in the roughly 0.2 percent 
of cases that might require relitigation.12 The high settlement rate 
reinforces the idea that certification would probably be unnecessarily 
costly. Certification orders would be required even in the majority of 
cases in federal court that would likely settle before courts expend 
10. Id. 
11. Buehler, supra note 3, at 655 n.7. 
12. The reasoning here is similar to the analysis of ex ante regulation versus ex post liability. 
Buehler’s solution is similar to regulation (requiring parties and judges to incur the cost of 
jurisdictional certification in every case), whereas the current rule is like liability (imposing costs on 
the parties only when jurisdictional mistakes actually occur). See Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm 
Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357, 364 (1984) (arguing that “there seems to be an 
underlying advantage in favor of liability, for most of its administrative costs are incurred only if 
harm occurs. As this will usually be infrequent, administrative costs will be low.”). 
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significant resources.13 
Second, many of the cases belatedly dismissed for jurisdictional 
defects would probably settle before relitigation in state court, meaning 
that the post-dismissal costs in those cases are likely to be small. 
Uncertainty and mutual optimism are the key impediments to 
settlement.14 Litigation in federal court provides the parties with 
information, such as how well witnesses would testify and a judicial 
view of contested legal issues. That information reduces uncertainty and 
optimism and thus increases the likelihood of settlement after dismissal. 
Third, the costs of the proposed jurisdictional certification would be 
high due to the difficulty of determining jurisdiction in some cases. That 
is, while certification will be relatively easy in most cases, some would 
require resolution of intricate factual or legal issues. For example, 
deciding where an individual is domiciled or a corporation is 
headquartered may involve challenging factual inquiries. Similarly, 
supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 can require both 
intricate legal analysis and the exercise of judicial discretion. Since most 
cases settle, deferring resolution of jurisdictional issues in such cases can 
save both judges and parties considerable time and money. To 
streamline adjudication, Professor Buehler proposes that judges rely on 
pleadings and affidavits rather than live testimony.15 Even if it were 
possible to resolve difficult jurisdictional issues with only pleadings and 
affidavits, the costs are likely to be large when multiplied by the 
thousands of cases each year in which difficult jurisdictional issues 
probably arise. 
Fourth, most judges already check subject matter jurisdiction at the 
outset of all cases. In many chambers, that task is delegated to law 
clerks,16 while in others the task is performed by interns or the judge 
herself. Nevertheless, judges do not ordinarily write up their findings or 
have their staff do so. Rather the clerks or interns just check off a box on 
a form or checklist. While it is true that judges are likely to be more 
careful if they have to issue an order explaining their reasoning, they 
would likely find only a small number of additional jurisdictional 
13. About two-thirds of cases in federal court settle. Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, 
What is the Settlement Rate and Why Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 115 
(2009). Nevertheless, it is not known how many of these cases settle after significant judicial 
resources are incurred in resolving pre-answer motions, discovery disputes, or summary judgment 
motions.  
14. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 779–84 (9th ed. 2014). 
15. Buehler, supra note 3, at 699–700. 
16.  See, e.g., CALVERT G. CHIPCHASE, FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT LAW CLERK HANDBOOK 66 
(2007). 
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defects. Judges (and clerks) already have a significant incentive to find 
jurisdictional defects, because doing so reduces their caseload and thus 
increases their leisure and/or the quality of work they can perform on 
their remaining cases. The additional time required to write the 
jurisdictional orders should not be underestimated. The average federal 
district court judge has more than 400 civil case filings per year.17 Even 
if each jurisdictional certification order took only fifteen minutes to 
prepare, that is still more than 100 hours per year, or roughly two weeks 
of work. 
Fifth, in addition to the costs placed on the courts, Professor 
Buehler’s proposals would also require increased effort by lawyers. The 
lawyers would likely then pass the costs along to their clients. Buehler 
proposes a requirement that parties plead subject matter jurisdiction with 
specificity in order to facilitate jurisdictional certification.18 Although 
lawyers can probably prepare such pleadings without much difficulty, a 
small amount of time and effort per case translates into a large aggregate 
cost when multiplied by the more than 250,000 civil cases filed in 
federal court each year. Even if complying with the heightened pleading 
standard took only ten extra minutes per case, that would translate into 
more than 20,000 extra hours of work per year. 
Sixth, the cost of interlocutory appeals of subject matter rulings must 
be considered. Although appeals will probably be infrequent, they 
demand substantial time and effort for both litigants and judges. In 
addition, parties may appeal for strategic reasons, such as delay. Such 
strategic appeals could prolong litigation and strain plaintiffs’ lawyers’ 
resources, which are often scarce. 
Finally, the cost of relitigation may not be as high as commentators 
suggest. When a case is dismissed, the time spent in federal court does 
not amount to time wasted. The most expensive part of litigation is 
discovery, and nothing ordinarily prevents parties from reusing, in state 
court, the depositions, documents, and other materials gathered and 
generated in federal court.19 Similarly, much of the legal research 
(except research about federal procedure) will remain relevant in state 
court. In general, parties can reuse the work performed by experts, 
except trial testimony, with only minor editing and reformatting. This is 
not, of course, to assert that relitigating a case in state court is not 
17. See Judicial Business 2013–U.S. District Courts, supra note 9.  
18. Buehler, supra note 3, at 697–700. 
19. See, e.g., WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER ET AL., FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL ch. 
2D-11b (National ed. 2014) (“Discovery obtained while the case was [in federal court] is certainly 
admissible in the state court proceedings.”). 
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expensive, but only that the costs will not equal those of bringing a new 
lawsuit. 
II. THE COMMENSURABILITY OF EFFICIENCY AND 
STRUCTURAL VALUES, AND THE BENEFITS OF 
FEDERALISM 
In order to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction should be 
waivable, Professor Buehler and most commentators would require 
consideration of both litigation costs and federalism. For example, a 
belated dismissal on jurisdictional grounds increases litigation costs (by 
requiring relitigation), but enhances federalism (by sending appropriate 
cases to state court). Professor Buehler asserts that these two values are 
incommensurable.20 At the outset, it is not clear why this matters. Even 
if litigation costs and federalism are incommensurable, judges and other 
policymakers must make trade-offs. No one claims that federalism is so 
important that it would justify extremely large litigation expenditures, 
such as allowing collateral attacks on subject matter jurisdiction grounds 
or requiring state representatives to monitor federal courts to ensure that 
they stay within statutory and constitutional grounds. Conversely, no one 
claims that litigation costs are so much more important than federalism 
that subject matter jurisdiction should just be ignored in order to save 
costs. The question is how to reach the appropriate balance or trade-off 
between litigation costs and federalism. Professor Buehler calls the 
appropriate balance “equilibrium,” a term not clearly defined in his 
article.21 His idea of equilibrium does not seem related to the more 
rigorous concepts of equilibrium that one finds in game theory or 
elsewhere.22 
Incommensurability is usually an issue when one is dealing with 
fundamental values, such as autonomy, equality, or dignity.23 Federalism 
is not such a value. It is not a value in itself, but rather is instrumental 
towards other values, such as responsiveness to local concerns and the 
prevention of tyranny. 
One of the major achievements of the pioneers of law and economics, 
most importantly Gary Becker and Richard Posner, was the insight that 
efficiency means much more than minimizing costs easily or ordinarily 
20. Buehler, supra note 3, at 665–68. 
21. Buehler, supra note 3, at 668. 
22. See generally ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION (4th ed. 2001). 
23. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 
779 (1994). 
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measured in dollars and cents.24 For example, criminal justice policy 
does not involve consideration of incommensurable values simply 
because it involves both costs (such as the cost of policing) and public 
safety. Rather, public safety itself can be expressed in monetary terms. 
People prefer not to be assaulted or robbed, and their preferences can be 
expressed in monetary terms and measured by looking at how much they 
actually pay to avoid such risks (such as by living in a safer 
neighborhood or hiring private security). Similarly, environmental 
policy requires consideration of both cost and environmental quality. 
However, that does not mean that it requires consideration of 
incommensurable values, because the value of environmental quality can 
be measured by surveys of willingness to pay (or accept) or by looking 
at actual decision-making (such as how much people are willing to pay 
to live in less polluted places). 
The fundamental insights of the economic analysis of procedure are 
that most procedural issues involve trade-offs between litigation costs 
and accuracy, and that accuracy has a monetary value.25 Wrongly 
decided cases provide suboptimal incentives for later behavior. That is, 
parties, anticipating a certain rate of court error, may take less (or more) 
than optimal precautions against tort injuries. Alternatively, they may 
breach (or perform) inefficiently or otherwise behave in ways that 
impose excessive costs on others (or themselves). The more accurate the 
adjudication, the more people have incentives to conform their actions to 
law. As long as the law is efficient or has other goals that can be 
measured in economic terms, one can therefore sensibly think about 
procedures that increase or decrease accuracy in monetary terms, 
because one can evaluate the monetary impact of more or less 
compliance with the relevant substantive law. As a result, one can make 
trade-offs between litigation costs and accuracy, because both can be 
measured in monetary terms. Like criminal justice, environmental 
regulation, and procedure generally, subject matter jurisdiction can be 
subjected to economic analysis in a way that takes into account values, 
such as litigation costs and federalism, which might initially seem to be 
incommensurable. 
What is the value of the proper allocation of cases between federal 
and state court? What are the benefits of state-court adjudication of cases 
not within federal subject matter jurisdiction? Examination of those 
24. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 
(1968); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1st ed. 1972). 
25. See POSNER, supra note 14, at 773–74.  
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benefits helps determine whether the benefits of dismissing cases with 
belatedly-discovered jurisdictional defects outweigh the costs discussed 
in Part I.26 
First, state court judges may be in the best position to accurately 
adjudicate cases that do not fall under federal jurisdiction. Such cases 
likely involve state law, an area with which state court judges are more 
familiar than their federal counterparts. The very independence of 
federal judges may mean that they are not influenced by local values in 
the way that state legislators and common law judges intended. Federal 
judges may therefore reach decisions not in accord with the preferences 
of the state residents who elected the legislators and, directly or 
indirectly, the judges. Nevertheless, although federal judges are not 
experts in state law, they are generally very competent, and probably, on 
average, of higher quality than state court judges.27 In addition, local 
values likely influence federal district court judges, too, as they 
generally live and formerly practiced in the state where they sit. Thus, 
the extent to which federal adjudication is less accurate or less in tune 
with state values is likely to be small. Furthermore, if different outcomes 
resulted from a case being adjudicated in federal and state courts, such 
differences would likely have benefited one of the parties. The cases in 
which neither party objects to subject matter jurisdiction are likely to be 
the cases in which neither party anticipated that federal judges would 
decide the case much differently than state court judges. Thus, it is likely 
that the benefits of relitigation in state court in terms of increased 
accuracy would be very small, if they exist at all. 
Second, even if one were skeptical that state judges were more 
accurate, state procedures and funding levels reflect the views of state 
legislators and judges about the optimal balance between cost and 
accuracy for cases within state court jurisdiction. Most, if not all, state 
courts receive less funding per case than federal courts, reflecting an 
assessment that accuracy is less valuable in state court cases. When a 
case is improperly adjudicated in federal court, the additional litigation 
costs incurred as a result of having litigated in federal courts may not be 
justified by the increase, if any, in accuracy. Nevertheless, when 
jurisdictional mistakes are caught late in the litigation process, the higher 
costs of federal adjudication are sunk costs. Requiring relitigation in 
26. For a somewhat different analysis of the costs and benefits of federal jurisdiction, see 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 273–303 (1996). 
27. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 
UCLA L. REV. 233, 276–77 (1988) (discussing the literature comparing the quality of federal and 
state judges). 
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state court only increases litigation costs. Religitation in state court, 
therefore, provides no benefit in terms of achieving the optimal balance 
between accuracy and cost. 
Third, when federal judges adjudicate cases that should be heard in 
state court, they have less time to hear cases properly in their 
jurisdiction. This could result in less accurate adjudication of the cases 
properly in federal court. Of course, that reduction in accuracy could be 
mitigated by hiring more federal judges. Nevertheless, that would 
probably reduce the average quality of federal judges or require higher 
pay. In addition, when jurisdictional mistakes are discovered at trial or 
on appeal, federal judges and their staff have already invested 
considerable time. Sending the case to state court to be adjudicated again 
does not allow federal judges to recoup the time already spent and so 
does not improve the accuracy of adjudication in federal court. In 
addition, the federal adjudicatory time saved by dismissal pales in 
comparison to the additional state court time that relitigation requires. 
Furthermore, the additional state court time spent on relitigated cases 
reduces time spent on other cases, thus lowering overall state court 
accuracy. 
Fourth, a case improperly adjudicated in federal court causes 
precedent in that area of law to develop more slowly in state court. That 
increases uncertainty and, in turn, reduces settlement. It also delays the 
adoption of what state court judges consider to be the most appropriate 
law. Clarification of the law could, of course, come from legislation, but 
that is also costly. Nevertheless, as previously mentioned, jurisdictional 
defects are belatedly discovered in only about 500 cases per year.28 That 
is, on average, ten cases per state per year. Given that state courts hear 
millions of cases per year, the impact on the development of state law is 
trivial. The impact is also very small in comparison to the real 
degradation of state capacity to develop precedent that comes from the 
fact that federal courts often decide state law issues. For example, in 
certain areas, such as mass tort law, many, if not most, cases are 
properly heard in federal court (because of diversity) even though state 
law governs. 
Fifth, if federal courts usurped most, or all, state court cases, states 
would lose much of their ability to shape state law. To the extent that 
conditions are different from state to state, and state legislators and 
judges are best able to formulate law appropriate to state conditions, 
federalization of the law may result in less efficient law. If federal courts 
28. Buehler, supra note 3, at 655 n.7. 
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routinely made mistakes, that would cripple state lawmaking and invoke 
the sorts of concerns about federal tyranny that concerned anti-
federalists in the founding era and that animate Tea Party activists today. 
Nevertheless, the rate of federal court jurisdictional error is so low as to 
make this concern irrelevant. In fact, far from usurping state court 
jurisdiction, federal judges seem to go out of their way to avoid cases 
that arguably are within their jurisdiction. For example, federal courts 
created the complete diversity requirement, the well-pleaded complaint 
rule, and the exemption of family law cases from diversity jurisdiction, 
even though neither Article III of the Constitution nor the text of the 
relevant jurisdictional statutes require these limitations. In addition, if 
one were suspicious that federal judges would usurp state judicial power, 
it would be odd to remedy that problem by requiring those same federal 
judges to dismiss cases for jurisdictional reasons. Rather, if one were 
concerned about federal judicial tyranny, one would want to design a 
mechanism in which a state official had the power to intervene to protect 
state court jurisdiction. 
The five costs discussed above show that it is possible to analyze 
federalism and related structural values in a way that is commensurable 
with litigation costs. Although federalism is not usually analyzed in this 
way, benefits one, two, four, and five can be seen as economic 
interpretations of the responsiveness to the local concern aspect of 
federalism. Similarly, the fifth benefit relates to the concerns about the 
prevention of tyranny that are also an important strand of federalism. 
Nevertheless, by analyzing federalism as a set of particular concerns 
rather than a single “value,” one can more easily appreciate whether 
federalism is truly threatened by occasional federal court mistakes 
relating to subject matter jurisdiction. This analysis suggests that the cost 
of jurisdictional mistakes (or at least those currently caught by federal 
judges) is far lower than the cost of sending those cases back to state 
court for relitigation. While federalism costs are commensurable with 
litigation costs in that one could, in theory, put a dollar amount on them, 
they are certainly hard to measure with any precision. Nevertheless, the 
sort of common-sense reasoning used above shows that one can make 
rough comparisons. This analysis suggests that both prior commentators 
and Professor Buehler are probably correct to limit the time in which 
jurisdictional objections can be raised so as to avoid the cost of 
relitigation in state court. That is, the federalism benefits of relitigation 
are smaller than the additional litigation costs of doing so. 
III. INVOLVING STATE ATTORNEY GENERALS 
The economic analysis above suggests that the current practice of 
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allowing subject matter defects to be raised at any time is not justified by 
cost-benefit analysis or efficiency, even when such analysis takes into 
account both federalism concerns and litigation costs. Part I, however, 
argued that Professor Buehler’s solution was likely to be even more 
costly than the status quo. Nevertheless, as suggested in Part II, 
Professor Buehler may be correct that other proposals, which would cut 
off jurisdictional objections without adding additional safeguards, may 
be insufficiently attentive to federalism concerns. This section suggests 
an alternative that might better protect state court prerogatives without 
adding significant extra costs. 
One of the reasons that subject matter jurisdiction is non-waivable 
and can be raised sua sponte by federal judges is that it affects interests 
not directly represented in the litigation. Most importantly, as discussed 
in the prior section, jurisdictional mistakes affect the capacity of state 
courts to develop precedents and of states more generally to develop 
their own law. The parties to litigation do not ordinarily take those 
concerns into account, so their consent to jurisdiction or failure to object 
is rightly considered not to be determinative. Nevertheless, as I also 
discussed in Part II, the impact of occasional judicial mistakes on these 
federalism concerns is minimal. Thus, routinely dismissing such cases is 
unnecessary. An optimal solution would identify the cases for which the 
impact on state precedent and lawmaking were large enough to justify 
the cost of relitigation. Dismissal would then only be appropriate in such 
cases. 
It might be sufficient to give federal judges discretion to retain cases 
in which jurisdictional defects are discovered late, with the expectation 
that they would dismiss only cases involving significant issues of state 
law. In these situations, the benefits of relitigation in state court would 
be high. In making that decision, it might be wise to allow federal judges 
to consult persons with interests in state lawmaking capacity, such as the 
appropriate state attorney general. Just as the United States Supreme 
Court can call for the views of the Solicitor General when deciding 
whether to grant certiorari in cases that affect the federal government,29 
so might federal judges call for the views of the relevant state attorney 
general when deciding whether to dismiss a case in which a 
jurisdictional defect has been found late in the proceedings. 
I suspect that state attorneys general would generally respond (if at 
29. See David C. Thompson & Melanie F. Wachtell, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court 
Certiorari Petition Procedures: The Call for Response and the Call for the Views of the Solicitor 
General, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 237 (2009); John F. Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of 
the Solicitor General, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 518, 525 (2010).  
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all) that they do not think relitigation in state court would be appropriate. 
State courts tend to be overcrowded, so any benefit to state lawmaking 
capacity would usually be outweighed by further burdens on the state 
court system. Nevertheless, if a state attorney general asserted a 
significant state interest in having a case relitigated in state court, that 
would be a signal to the federal judge that the case is one in which the 
benefits of relitigation may outweigh the costs. 
IV. POSSIBLE BENEFITS OF THE CURRENT RULE 
Before concluding, it is important to consider whether the current 
practice of allowing jurisdictional objections to be raised at any time has 
benefits that might justify its costs. One possible benefit is that it may 
encourage litigants and judges to be more careful about jurisdiction at 
the outset. If judges know that their hard work will be for naught in 
cases in which jurisdictional defects are later found, they may try harder 
to find jurisdictional defects early. In fact, this concern may motivate the 
current practice employed by many district court judges—having their 
clerks check jurisdiction soon after filing. If a plaintiff knows that a 
judge or defendant may raise jurisdictional objections late in the case 
and force expensive relitigation, it makes sense for the plaintiff to 
research jurisdiction more carefully before filing suit. Similarly, 
defendants, who often prefer to be in federal court, may be incentivized 
to raise jurisdictional problems if they know that the consequence of not 
doing so early on is that they may incur significant litigation expense 
only to have the case ultimately dismissed. These considerations 
paradoxically suggest that a rule allowing later challenges to subject 
matter jurisdiction may be a good way of incentivizing early and 
thorough investigation of subject matter jurisdiction. 
Although the arguments in the prior paragraph are plausible, 
offsetting considerations exist. District court judges may be less diligent 
about subject matter jurisdiction early in a case if they know that they 
can correct jurisdictional defects later. Similarly, if one party has private 
information undermining jurisdiction, it may strategically conceal that 
information and then reveal it later only if the federal litigation is going 
badly and religitigation in state court offers a welcome “second bite at 
the apple.”30 
The current regime is also beneficial in situations where jurisdictional 
issues are closely connected to the merits of the case. In such situations, 
30. Wagman, supra note 2, at 1432.  
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it is very difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain jurisdiction early in the 
case, and it makes sense to defer consideration until the relevant facts 
have been investigated through discovery and possibly even until they 
are resolved at trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Professor Buehler correctly points out potential problems with the 
current jurisdictional regime. The issue certainly requires further 
examination. Nevertheless, his analysis in terms of incommensurable 
efficiency and structural values does not take into account modern 
economic analysis. In addition, his proposal to require district court 
judges to issue jurisdictional certification orders in all cases would likely 
impose higher costs in the aggregate than relitigating the estimated 0.2 
percent of cases in which jurisdictional defects are belatedly found. A 
more efficient solution might be to give discretion to district court 
judges to retain or dismiss such cases, perhaps after calling for the views 
of the relevant state attorney general. In addition, before changing the 
current regime, it is also important to recognize the ways in which 
allowing later challenges to subject matter jurisdiction may, 
paradoxically, incentivize more thorough, early investigation into 
subject matter jurisdiction. 
 
 
